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Abstract. Berkeley doesn’t use the time-gap argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only perceive ideas, is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, Anthony Grayling, Howard Robinson, David Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the time-gap argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian ideal​ism. I also indicate how the latter provides a solution to Jerry Valberg’s “puzzle of experience” and disarms James Cornman’s argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem.

      It is one of the main theses of a quite brilliant philosophical book recently written on visual perception—The Problem of Perception by David Smith—that “Direct Realism ... cannot be shown to be” false “by reflecting on the nature of perception.”​[1]​ In aid of this, Smith extensively and carefully discusses the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Hallucination, and attempts to show that they do not pose insuperable threats to (a certain sort of) Direct Realism. However, he says very little about the Time-Gap Argument, which Russell, Broad, Cornman,​[2]​ and a few other philosophers believe does effectively refute (that very sort of) Direct Realism. 
     In this paper I will try to make this belief plausible. I will do so with the help of George Berkeley who, I shall argue, is both (1) useful for the defense of a crucial premise in this argument and (2) himself in need not only of its conclusion but also of the way it has been reached, in order to reinforce his own case for a rather idiosyncratic view—that very special (and different) brand of Direct Realism combined with Idealism that he alludes to towards the end of the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (henceforward Dialogues):
My endeavors tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth, which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only in the mind. Which two notions put together, do in effect constitute the substance of what I advance.​[3]​
     The first of these “notions” is a Direct Realism that is distinct from the Direct Realism discussed by Smith. The latter combines (1) an epistemological component, the view that we “directly perceive the physical world,” with (2) a metaphysical component, the view “that the physical world has an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being ‘cognized’—that is, perceived or thought about.” Smith goes on to say that according to Direct Realism’s metaphysical component, “[t]he physical world is not, as it is usually put, dependent on ‘consciousness,’ at least not finite consciousness.” This gives us a Realism that “is opposed to Idealism: the view that whatever seems to be physical is either reducible to, or at least supervenient upon, cognitive states of consciousness.”​[4]​
     Berkeley’s Direct Realism, too, has an epistemological component, and it is the same as that of the Direct Realism discussed by Smith; but its metaphysical component is just the opposite. The metaphysical component of Berkeley’s Direct Realism is captured in the second “notion” that he mentions, which, of course, implies Idealism as characterized by Smith. Thus we may call Berkeley’s Direct Realism Idealist, and Smith’s Direct Realism Non-Idealist. 
     Smith, as I said, is rather terse about the Time-Gap Argument, and Berkeley doesn’t use it all. I think that Berkeley could and should have used it if only for the reason of making things even easier for himself—and other defenders of Idealist Direct Realism—than he thought they already were.
     And Berkeley did think they were quite easy; we need only recall what he says in the Principles, section 6: “Some truths are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them.” The eyes and the seeing here are metaphorical, of course, but what Berkeley wants to say is that the truths in question don’t need any elaborate arguments on their behalf; it’s almost enough just to state them, as he forthwith proceeds to do with one of them, which he calls “important”:
to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence, without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.​[5]​  
Now, of course, this ‘important’ truth so obvious to Berkeley was very hard to see for very many if not most other philosophers, then and now; instead, what they found it absolutely easy to do is just what Berkeley claimed in the same section of the Principles to be utterly impossible; that is, to “separate” in their “own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.”




     The first philosopher to state and use the Time-Gap Argument (henceforward, TGA) was, as far as I know, Leibniz, in his New Essays on Human Understanding. He did so in the context of claims (by Philalethes, a spokesman for Locke) that “the ideas which are received by sensation are often altered by the judgment of the mind in grown people” and that “we substitute the cause of the image for what actually appears to us, and confound judging with seeing.” Assenting to this, Leibniz (in the guise of Theophilus) says that when 
we are deceived by a painting our judgments are doubly in error. First, we substitute the cause for the effect, and believe that we immediately see the thing that causes the image. For strictly we see only the image, and are affected only by rays of light. Since rays of light need time—however little—to reach us, it is possible that the object should be destroyed during the interval and no longer exists when the light reaches the eye; and something which no longer exists cannot be the present object of our sight. Secondly, we are further deceived when we substitute one cause for another and believe that what comes merely from a flat painting actually comes from a body.​[6]​
     It is, of course, just the first deception that concerns us here, and it is in the course of describing it that Leibniz succinctly lays out the version of TGA just stated. Its conclusion—that we immediately see only the image and not the thing that causes the image—is one that Berkeley, although he didn’t use the argument, no doubt would have accepted, if only because he thought that the image, in strict parlance, is caused by God and we can’t see God.
     Let’s restate this Leibnizian argument in terms of an example that Berkeley uses: 
     (1) Suppose I behold a picture of Julius Caesar by candle-light. 
     (2) Since rays of light need time to reach me, it is possible that the picture should be destroyed during the interval and no longer exist when the light reaches my eye.
     (3) Now suppose that this picture actually has been destroyed during this interval.
     (4) But something that no longer exists cannot be the present object of my sight.
     (5) Therefore, what I immediately see when I behold the picture of Julius Caesar is not the picture itself but something else, its image, which is both like the picture and has been caused by it.
     Is this an argument that Berkeley could or would have used?  
     First of all, even though the notion of cause employed in it is not the notion of “proper active efficient cause” which is central to his metaphysics and is employed by him in the Principles and the Dialogues, it is the notion of “second corporeal causes” that he mentions in section 71 of De Motu​[7]​ and also in his 1729 letter to Johnson, where he refers to such causes as “occasional causes” and claims this notion is “requisite in the best physics.”​[8]​ 
     In other words, it is precisely the notion to whose existence and importance for George Berkeley Bertil Belfrage​[9]​ has recently done so much to call our attention, a notion which is also deftly handled by Anthony Grayling in his elegant exposition of Berkeley’s arguments as moving at three levels: (1) that of “the basic data of sensory experience”; (2) that of “ordinary thought and talk about everyday experience and its objects”; and (3) the “metaphysical level, which provides the ultimate framework of explanation for levels 1 and 2.”​[10]​ 
     Thus on this count (involving the notion of “cause”), the preceding imaginary argument cannot be disqualified from being one that Berkeley could have used.
     Second, if Berkeley had wanted to use TGA as an argument for Idealist Direct Realism, it would have had to be metaphysical, using the strict and philosophical notion of “proper active efficient cause.”  
    Therefore, Berkeley would not have used this argument, appealing as it does only to second corporeal causes, to make a metaphysical point.
     On the other hand, and third, could he have used it to prove a point in the psychology of vision—the same point that Leibniz makes, i.e., that in seeing Julius Caesar’s picture I immediately see only its causal effect, not it iself?
     Other, later philosophers who have used TGA did go on to argue that even though I see the effect immediately or directly, I see the picture itself indirectly. Berkeley could not and did not argue this.
    But even if an appeal to second corporeal causes is perfectly acceptable in the psychology of vision, I think—and this is my fourth point—that Berkeley would definitely not have used TGA, as just formulated, for the following reason. 
     To see this, let’s go back once more to the Leibniz version, where he is saying that we see something all right and believe it’s the picture we see—but it can’t be the picture because it has been destroyed, so what we see is something very much like it (otherwise we wouldn’t think we still see it), and that is the image.
     Now we may presume that Leibniz would have known that light travels at such a high finite velocity and that the distance between any picture and human eyes is so small that the picture’s destruction one or two nanoseconds after light-rays had left it is something we could not consciously notice.
    Since, however, he famously had a doctrine of unconscious perception, this would not have impeded Leibniz from making a meaningful distinction between our seeing the picture and our seeing its image. So Leibniz would probably have claimed, in defense of his time-gap argument (and here I state this defense in the words of Howard Robinson who wrote them without explicit reference to Leibniz), “that the fact that we cannot discriminate very small time intervals is simply irrelevant. Whether or not I can discriminate such an interval, I do in fact perceive” the picture as it was some minuscule part “of a second ago; and it could, conceivably, have changed in some perceptible respect just in that time, so that by the time I in fact perceive it it is different from how I perceive it to be.”​[11]​




     For Berkeley TGA could only get off the ground if we knew, on independent grounds, that a certain visible object had ceased to exist at time t and yet an intuitively appreciable moment later we still seemed to see it, i.e., it appeared to us as though it were still there.
     That’s why Berkeley, if he had used TGA, would have stated it in terms of seeing a star, the sun, or even the moon. 
     Let us, therefore, construct a TGA for Berkeley in terms of seeing the sun. And let us put it at a place where it might naturally have occurred. That could be late in the First Dialogue, somewhere after Hylas suggests “there are two kinds of objects, the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas; the other are real things or external objects perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations.”​[12]​ This is a statement of the Representative, or Indirect, Realism that Philonous is concerned to refute, and a Berkeleian TGA would do that nicely.
     Let’s recall that the main purpose of TGA is usually to refute Non-Idealist Direct Realism. Those who endorse TGA then usually go on to prove Indirect Realism rather than refute it. But it’s also possible instead to go on to try to prove Idealist Direct Realism. This would require a Berkeleian TGA, which aims to refute both Non-Idealist Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. The best way to lay out this argument, though, is to start with what Hylas might say to refute Non-Idealist Direct Realism and to prove Indirect Realism. 
     (1) Suppose I look at what I take to be the sun. 
     (2) Since rays of light from the sun need about eight minutes’ time to reach me, it is possible that the sun should be destroyed during that interval and no longer exist when its light reaches my eye.
     (3) Now suppose that the sun actually has been destroyed during this interval.
     (4) But something that no longer exists cannot be the present object of my sight.
     Therefore, 
     (5) What I immediately see when I look at the sun is not the sun itself, which so long as it exists exists without the mind, but something else which never exists without the mind, which is an image or representation of the sun, and which has been caused by the sun.
     So far this is only an argument against Non-Idealist Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism in one case; arguing for Indirect Realism in general would involve showing that in all cases where the sun (or any other object) is not destroyed but continues to exist, a perceiver would both immediately see the image of the sun (or other object) and mediately see the sun (or other object) itself. For non-fictional philosophers, this usually means having recourse to a Continuity Argument.  
       Philonous, of course, cannot accept this conclusion, but Hylas’s argument seems to be valid with no false premises. So how might Philonous answer it? 
       He might say, first, that what strictly follows from premises (1)-(4) is not (5) but something weaker, something without the explicit mind-independence claim about the sun and without the explicit mind-dependence claim about the image and also without the causal claim:
     (51) What I immediately see when I look at the sun is not the sun itself but something else which is an image or representation of the sun.
     That the sun is mind-independent and that the image is mind-dependent are further claims needing additional premises for their derivation.
     But even (51) is something that Philonous would not accept for a variety of reasons, one of which is implied by his question, “...directing your open eyes toward yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun?”​[13]​
     Still, since (51) seems to have been validly derived from true premises, how can Philonous avoid it? Consistently with Berkeley’s principles he can do so only by claiming that the term “sun” in the argument is not univocal and that the sun which has emitted the light-rays that reach my eyes and which has been destroyed while the rays were travelling is not the sun that, as premise (1) has it, I take myself to be looking at when looking “toward yonder part of the heaven.”
     What I see, therefore, is the visible sun the existence of which Berkeley implies in his works on vision (and which Grayling would assign to level 1). But what is the sun that has emitted the light-rays and has since been destroyed? Remembering that we have not only the Berkeley who speaks strictly and philosophically but also the one who speaks with the vulgar,​[14]​ we claim this sun is precisely the sun in the “common vulgar sense” of, say, PC724,​[15]​ the sun of Grayling’s level 2. This is the ordinary, causally active physical sun which at level 3 is replaced by Berkeley (according to Grayling) with an inactive, mind-dependent collection of ideas caused by God.
     Now let us recapitulate, and then continue and complete, the argument entirely from Berkeley’s point of view:  
     (1) Suppose I look at what I take to be the sun. 
     (2) Since rays of light from the sun, according to the physicists, need about eight minutes’ time to reach me, it is possible that the sun should be destroyed during that interval and no longer exist when its light reaches my eye.
     (3) Now just suppose that the sun actually has been destroyed during this interval.
     (4) But something that no longer exists can’t be something that I now immediately see.
     (5) Yet I do see something immediately that I take to be the sun.
Therefore, 
     (6) What I immediately see is a visible sun, not the sun of physics that I suppose to have been destroyed.   
     (7) But I immediately see only one visible sun and nothing else having a “conformity or resemblance to it”; only one dazzlingly bright thing in the heavens rather than two.
     (8) And in addition to an immediately seen visible sun I do not mediately see anything other resembling it.
Therefore,
     (9) Indirect or representative realism is false.
     (10) This visible sun, though perhaps secondarily caused by the sun of physics, has, like all things, strictly and truly been caused by God.
     (11) But a visible sun is a collection of ideas of color, light, and figure. 
     (12) This collection of ideas either exists without the mind or within the mind.
     (13) If it exists without the mind, then it could radically change without my noticing it.
     (14) But this collection of ideas could not radically change without my noticing it.
Therefore,
     (15) The visible sun I see exists within the mind.
     (16) Even if the sun of physics had not been destroyed (as in reality it never has been and most likely never will be in human life-time), I still would be immediately seeing a visible sun only—for exactly the reason mentioned in (7).   
     (17) Suppose that the sun of physics has not been destroyed, i.e., that (3) is false.
     (18) Then in the very act of immediately seeing a visible sun I am also perceiving, whether immediately or mediately, the undestroyed sun of physics, which is a larger collection of ideas of which the visible sun is a part.
Therefore,
     (19) Whenever I see the visible sun I perceive a larger collection of ideas, some of which I perceive immediately. 
     (20) But what is true of perceiving the visible sun is true, mutatis mutandis, of perceiving any sensible object whatsoever;
Therefore,
     (21) All sensible objects are ideas or collections of ideas which exist only in the mind. QED.




Since at least the beginning of the 20th century, however, the situation has been radically different. Not only has this conclusion not been obvious to most philosophers, but some of them have doubted whether there are such things as ideas at all, even under their modern appellations of “sense-data,” “sense-impressions,” “sensa,” and so forth. Hence there was a need to bring forth arguments for their existence if you believed in them.
     And TGA was one of those arguments. Most philosophers criticized it for its premise
    (4) Something that no longer exists can’t be something that I now 
         immediately see
because this entails that any object of direct awareness exists at the time of the awareness. Call this the simultaeneity-requirement on perception and distinguish it from the existence-requirement, which is simply that the object of direct awareness exist at some time or other. According to Smith, for example, the simultaneity-requirement can be rejected “without absurdity.”​[16]​ But can it? 
     Many philosophers share Smith's view on this issue but many others do not. The latter have a strong intuition that the notion of direct perceptual awareness of something in the past just doesn't make any sense. Clearly, the point can rationally be decided only by argument. Therefore, let me, following Howard Robinson,​[17]​ set out an argument for this premise as follows:
     (1) The direct perceptual awareness of a star, for example, is a psychological state that has content.  (2) The content of a psychological state is what (in whole or in part) constitutes that state, what (in whole or in part) makes it the state that it is. (3) What constitutes the direct perceptual awareness of a star, what makes it the state that it is, is, in part, the star one is directly perceptually aware of. (4) Anything which (in whole or in part) constitutes something else must exist at the same time as, or overlap in time with, the thing which it wholly or partly constitutes. (5) Therefore, the content of a direct perceptual awareness of a star cannot cease to exist at an earlier time than the direct perceptual awareness of which it is the content.
     In comments to me in an e-mail exchange, John Foster has objected to (4) on the grounds that it isn't “obvious that anything which partly constitutes something else must exist at the same time as, or overlap in time, this other thing,” and anyway, that my claim would be taken by the Direct Realist as begging the question. In answer to my question, “If 'this other thing' exists from time t onwards to time t+1, then how can the thing that partly constitutes it (and thereby is a part of it) exist entirely before time t?,” Foster replied by saying that the Direct Realist “won't think that the earlier object is part of the later perceptual episode, but only that the perceptual state (type-state) which that episode realizes is a state of being aware of that earlier item, and so a state that could not be realized if that item did not exist (my emphasis). It is only in this sense that he will take the earlier item to be partly constitutive of the later perception.”

What would Berkeley say about this? 

Perceivings and perceived objects

At Principles, section 5 he says that “it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.” This, plus the statement in the first edition that “in truth the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot, therefore, be abstracted from each other”​[18]​ and the PC585​[19]​ entry “wherein I pray you does the perception of white differ from white” all suggest a principle that S. A. Grave and Colin Turbayne have called the Identity Principle; but Grayling thinks that this label is “wholly misleading,” since Berkeley, according to Grayling, is not committed “to the view that ideas are identical with perceivings of them.”​[20]​ 
     If that were Berkeley’s view, the conclusion that if a thing is perceived at a certain time then it must exist at that time would readily follow. But that’s not his view, acccording to Grayling: Berkeley is not claiming 
that a particular idea is to be identified with a particular perceiving of it, for the non-identity of states of awareness and their contents is a thesis already well entrenched as the view that, from the finitary viewpoint, ideas, at any rate those that constitute real things, are not dependent for their existence on any particular finite perceiving of them. What it means not to be able to ‘conceive apart’ any ‘sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it’ (P5) is therefore far from a claim that the idea and the perception of it are numerically the same thing, but raher that an idea is always and essentially an idea perceived, and perception is always and essentially the perception of ideas.​[21]​
     So the question is as follows: For Berkeley, are sensations and their objects merely non-abstractable one from the other, as Grayling claims, or actually numerically identical, as Turbayne claims? 
     I think that this specific objection to Turbayne’s reading misfires. When Grayling says that “from the finitary viewpoint” ideas that constitute real things “are not dependent for their existence on any particular finite perceiving of them,” this is true, of course, if ‘dependent’ means ‘causally dependent’ (and in this context it cannot mean anything else). Now, for Berkeley, all ideas are particular and of particulars, and my idea of the visible sun can be like yours and a lot of other finite observers’, yet all of these ideas are in some way ontologically dependent on God (a point not only not denied, but positively emphasized, by Grayling). Which way that is, scholars dispute about: does God Himself perceive ideas like those of finite observers; or does He have a ‘volitional policy’ vis-à-vis finite observers, and if so, how does that work? But none of this in the least implies “the non-identity of states of awareness [particular perceivings] and their contents [particular ideas perceived],” as Grayling contends. On the contrary, the non-dependence of any particular idea’s existence on any particular finite perceiving of it seems to be perfectly compatible with any particular perceiving of it being numerically identical with that particular idea’s being perceived; just as this identity claim is compatible with Grayling’s own,  weaker reading of Berkeley “that an idea is always and essentially an idea perceived, and perception is always and essentially the perception of ideas”. 
     Still, I think Grayling is absolutely correct in thinking there is something wrong with the view (whether Berkeley held it or not) “that a particular idea is to be identified with a particular perceiving of it.” I will discuss this important point a bit later; first I briefly want to take up another thought of Grayling’s, namely, that there are a lot of examples of distinct items that are related by mutual non-abstractability. 
     In his words, “[e]very process-product relation, for example, is of this kind; bread and the baking of it, a picture and the painting of it, are cases in point.”​[22]​ Obviously, the loaf of bread cannot exist before it has been baked nor can the baking of it come after it, the loaf, has ceased to exist. But is the perception of a thing a process-product relation? 
     According to Belfrage, that’s exactly what it is in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision, where he “analyzes the perceiving process, not the end-product, so-called ‘sensible things’, which play a crucial part in the Principles.”​[23]​
     In Grayling’s view, “the natural model for Berkeley’s account of perception” is neither the process-product model nor even the act-object model
      because finite minds are passive in perceiving real ideas, which are input from an independent external source. Their passivity is embedded in activity, however, in the sense that to receive an idea involves having, say, to turn one’s eye or sniff at a rose (1D196). But although to this extent perception of real ideas involves activity, the content of a particular state of awareness is not produced by an act of will, as in the case of ideas of imagination, but is ‘somewhat consequent’ to eye-turnings and sniffings (ibid.), and therefore to be distinguished from them (1D197).​[24]​
     The best model, Grayling implies, is, therefore, the “state-content model”; and it is just in terms of such a model that last section’s Robinsonian argument (for the premise that if I see something now then it must exist now) has been formulated.
     If Turbayne’s interpretation of the ‘Identity Principle’ in Principles, section 5 is correct, i.e., if the thing immediately seen is identical with the seeing of it, then, of course, it just follows that if I see something now it must exist now. The problem here is not only that if someone doesn’t already accept the simultaneity-requirement he might be even less inclined to accept this as a reason for it, but also, and more importantly, that this is just dead wrong. A thing, whatever it is, can no more be identical with the seeing of it than a horse can be identical with the kicking of it. A headache, of course, is identical with the feeling of it; but this in no way warrants the claim that this pain (this headache, this feeling of it) is identical with the head that aches. The headache is only like the head in that both are mind-dependent. 
     Tom Stoneham argues forcefully in this connection that Berkeley is best understood as adhering to the subject-object model of perception, to be distinguished from the act-object model (which, according to Stoneham, is better called the ‘subject-act-object model’ to reveal all its elements). In addition to these two, there are three more models relevant to Berkeley: the adverbial model; the Representative Theory’s subject-object-object model, which Berkeley tries to refute; and the intentional model, which he never explicitly discusses. 
     The subject-model, dubbed SMP (The Simplest Model of (Sense) Perception), is introduced by Stoneham in the context of “the debate about whether Berkeley holds an act-object model of perception or an adverbial model”; according to the latter the distinction between act and object collapses. As Stoneham writes, 
     It is standardly assumed that if this distinction collapses, we are left with just the act, the perceiving, and consequently the difference between seeing red and seeing green must be the difference between seeing redly and seeing greenly. But a collapse can go either way: the object could collapse into the act or the act into the object. SMP holds that we do not have a duality of act and object, but merely an object (and a subject, of course, but the identity and properties of the subject are irrelevant to the content of the perception, to what is perceived). This alternative is obscured by the universal assumption that if S perceives O, then there is a (mental) event which is a perceiving of O by S. SMP simly denies this: when S perceives O, S and O exist, and they stand in a relation, namely perceiving, but their standing in this relation is neither constituted nor enabled by any concurrent event or occurrence in S.​[25]​ 
     Their standing in this relation is a state. That state, though (obviously) not constituted or enabled by any (other) event or occurrence in S, is trivially constituted by itself, by S’s perceiving O; and it exists as much as S and O do. There being this state of perceiving makes SMP a case of the state-content model (where content=object) preferred by Grayling (again, it might be more perspicuous to call it the ‘subject-state-content model’). 
     Thus SMP is committed to maintaining that when S perceives O there is a subject of perceiving, a relation of perceiving, and an object or content perceived. Now every model of perception except the adverbial one must agree that there is between S and O a relation of perceiving. Thus it is clear that SMP is incompatible with Turbaynes’s account of Berkeley, according to which the perceiving and the perceived are the same (unless the perceptual relation between S and O is not S’s perceiving of O; or that perceptual relation is identity; or there is no perceptual relation between S and O at all. But all three options are absurd.) This is another thing wrong with Turbayne’s reading, assuming that SMP really is Berkeley’s “default account of perception,” as Stoneham claims (correctly, in my opinion).
     On Stoneham’s account of Berkeley, if  S’s perceiving of O is realized at time t, then obviously S must exist at t; but doesn’t the same go for O? I would say so, but some philosophers (e.g., John Foster) claim it is logically possible for a perceptual relation to obtain now between a currently existing S and a past item O. I will return to this issue shortly (in the next section).
     If Grayling’s interpretation of Principles, section 5 in terms of non-abstractibility is correct (something very likely given the failure of Turbayne’s), then we do not get from that alone the conclusion that if I see something immediately now it must exist now. It could have existed earlier: what I immediately see now is something that existed earlier and was then also immediately perceived, of course; but not necessarily by me.
     However, if perceiving is a process-product relationship, as Grayling has Berkeley allowing “for ideas of imagination and for all God’s ideas” and Belfrage has Berkeley allowing for all human ideas that constitute sensible objects, then of course the object seen cannot cease to be before the seeing of it, but must come to be some time during the seeing of it (most likely, toward, or at, the end of it). And very often, the object endures after its production. Thus at least Belfrage’s Berkeley supports the premise we need.​[26]​ 

A further Berkeleian defense of simultaneity

John Foster, as we saw, is one philosopher who says he lacks the intuition that perception and perceived must at least be partly simultaneous. He also claims that insisting on this requirement would mean begging the question against the Non-Idealist Direct Realist.
     But why can’t we take a hard line here and say the simultaneity-requirement is so obvious that it’s the Non-Idealist Direct Realist who’s begging the question against both the Indirect Realist and the Idealist Direct Realist? If the speed of light had been infinite, or as long as its finitude had not dawned on people, nobody would have questioned the simultaneity requirement on perceivings and perceived items in the first place. I think that this is how Berkeley would have seen things. And here’s my argument.
     In Dialogues 238, when Hylas brings up the oar with one end in the water and asks Philonous how a man can be mistaken in thinking it crooked, Philonous gives a long reply, from which it is evident that Berkeley did take the simultaneity-requirement to be achingly self-evident, so much so that he neglected to spell it out explicitly. (This is in line with Robert J. Fogelin’s observation that “Berkeley’s grounds for committing himself to idealism involve a direct appeal to intuitions concerning the nature of things we encounter in experience”.​[27]​ I quote each of Philonous’s sentences and follow it with my elaboration of what I take to be Berkeley’s relevant intuition.
     Philonous: “He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions.” 
     What are they, these present perceptions? The perceivings he now has, or the ideas he now perceives? For Berkeley these presuppose each other. In the realm of ideas, every perceiving is of an idea; and every idea is actually perceived. The man’s present perceptions include both his perceivings and the ideas he perceives, about which, Berkeley emphatically tells us, he cannot be mistaken. His perceptions are not just his states of perceiving; they also contain the objects of perceiving, what he actually perceives; and it can’t be the case that he is at present perceiving something and that thing be not present but past; the perceiving and the perceived both occur at present, that is, now. 
     Philonous: “Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right.”
     The perceived thing is, not was, crooked. It could have been, but needn’t have been, crooked before; but now, at the time of perception, it certainly is crooked.
     Philonous: “But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken.”
    So if he takes the oar out of the water, in the immediate future, he will perceive not crookedness but straightness; now, not having taken the oar out of the water yet, he sees crookedness and would, if he touched the oar now, feel straightness; but upon taking the oar out he would both feel and see straightness (or, more precisely, feel tangible straightness and see visible straightness). 
     Philonous: “In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken.”
     Each perceiving at a station has its own distinct perceived object at that station; a station is a place, and at each place a moving man perceives an idea at least numerically different from the previous one. The perceived object is at the same time as the perceiving but not at the same place in physical space, since the man is moving toward the moon or tower. But, of course, in the final metaphysical synthesis, that is, at Grayling’s level 3, the stations and the perceived objects are at the same metaphorical places in God’s mind and in any number of finite minds.
     Philonous: “But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.”
     “What he perceives at present”, mentioned twice – this refers both to the time of the perception and to the time of the what, the content, of the perception – these times are the same. And this is something he can’t be mistaken about.
      Philonous: “The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.”
     We do not here and now see the vanishing of the sun or the explosion of a star; but because we know the Laws of Nature which, as Berkeley says at Principles 105, “extend our prospect beyond what is present, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures, touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come”, we know that if we had been placed sufficiently close to the sun or that star, we would at once have seen the vanishing or the explosion; but here and now, of course, we only see the sun’s shining or the star’s twinkling.





Let me end by briefly discussing two contemporary philosophers who accept the simultaneity-requirement but stand in different relations to Berkeley’s philosophy. They are stumped by questions to which Berkeley’s idealism has an answer.
     Jerry Valberg, in his The Puzzle of Experience, presents an amended and highly simplified TGA, which, he thinks, gives rise to an insoluble puzzle. Suppose that after the light-rays have left an external object, God eliminates that object but lets the light-rays reach our eyes and set in motion the usual cortical processes so that everything in our experience remains the same. What we then see is not, of course, the external object, which has been eliminated, but a sense-datum, an internal object, which exists only in so far as it is perceived. That’s what we are forced to conclude philosophically, because of the TGA, which is irrefutable and which exploits, most fundamentally, the “potential irrelevance” of the external thing to our experience.
     On the other hand, says Valberg, it’s just obvious that external objects do exist; one need only be open to how things are in one’s experience. So what we have is an irresolvable antinomy, which he calls “the puzzle of experience.”​[28]​ 
    But, I think, Berkeleian idealism does solve this puzzle. For according to it, it isn’t the object itself that causes my experience of it through any activity in my visual cortex, but God Himself who directly causes all external objects and all our experiences of them under certain appropriate circumstances. Hence, external things are actually (not just potentially) irrelevant to our experience. That’s exactly what the Berkeleian TGA leading to Idealism shows; it shows that all perceivable things are internal, but not that all things are internal: perceivers (including God) are all external with respect to each other. Valberg, of course, doesn’t believe that Berkeleian idealism can be proven, and that’s why his puzzle stays a puzzle, for him.
     James Cornman holds that Berkeleian “phenomenalism is plausible enough to be one of the leading contenders for the most reasonable theory of perception and the external world”​[29]​, but he thinks that it faces an objection from the time gap as revealed by the following argument:
     “If Berkeleian phenomenalism is true, then someone, s, sees a star at time t, if and only if at t he sesnses a sensum that is in the group of sensa which is identical with the star. But if at t someone senses a sensum that is in a group of sensa which is identical with a star, then the group and, therefore, the star exists at t. But just as some stars exist unseen, some stars are seen at times they do not exist. Therefore Berkeleian phenomenalism is false. It seems  that a Berkeleian has at most two ways to counter this argument: he can either deny that some things are seen when they do not exist, or deny that every sensum sensed when an external object is perceived is in the group of sensa that is identical with the object.”​[30]​
     This is absolutely right, and what our Berkeleian does is take the first alternative—he denies that some things are seen when they do not exist. He says that all things are seen when and only when they exist (if not by finite beings, then by God) and that what I see when I see something in the case of the no-longer existent (because exploded) star is its light. More exactly, since “star” is ambiguous as between “tangible star”, “visible star,” and “physical star”, what no longer exist (and therefore can no longer be felt or otherwise observed) are the tangible star and the physical star; but the visible star still exists; it is seen; and it is nothing but a speck of light. That, by the way, is what we human beings always see in the way of physical stars, even when they’re not exploded and still exist: in all cases we see just pinpricks of twinkling yellowish light—“visible stars” that have been emitted or caused (“vulgarly” speaking) by the “physical stars.”
     And as Len Carrier has said, “this saves what is correct in Berkeley.”​[31]​  Len Carrier is another Non-Idealist Direct Realist who accepts the simultaneity-requirement but, because of his deep Australian Materialist convictions, cannot follow Berkeley all (or even much of) the way. Still, by taking the TGA as proving that we always see light he plays directly into Berkeley’s hands. He stops where he does because he thinks (a) light is physical and (b) physical things do not depend on being perceived. But Berkeley would have no trouble accepting (a); he only denies (b), and his arguments for that denial are familiar and controversial. In the imagined Berkeleian TGA, some of them would come as support for premises (7), (8), (10), (11), (13), (14), (18), (19), and (20). I hope I have said enough to show that had Berkeley deployed his arguments against (b) in the course of presenting and defending something like the TGA, i.e., had he used TGA as a scaffold or framework for all his relevant arguments, his case for Idealist Direct Realism would have been even stronger and more perspicuous. In any event, the perceptual time-gap is an ace in the hole for any metaphysics in the vicinity of Berkeley.  
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